feat: overheid baseline (hardening opt-in, users, T495s host, 26.05 pin) #7
No reviewers
Labels
No labels
Compat/Breaking
Kind/Bug
Kind/Discussion
Kind/Documentation
Kind/Enhancement
Kind/Feature
Kind/Security
Kind/Testing
Priority
Critical
Priority
High
Priority
Low
Priority
Medium
Reviewed
Confirmed
Reviewed
Duplicate
Reviewed
Invalid
Reviewed
Won't Fix
Status
Abandoned
Status
Blocked
Status
Help Wanted
Status
Need More Info
Prio - Hoog
Prio - Laag
Prio - Middel
styling
No milestone
No project
No assignees
2 participants
Notifications
Due date
No due date set.
Dependencies
No dependencies set.
Reference
MinBZK/DAWO-NixOS!7
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue
No description provided.
Delete branch "bram.buijs/DAWO-NixOS:feat/overheid-baseline"
Deleting a branch is permanent. Although the deleted branch may continue to exist for a short time before it actually gets removed, it CANNOT be undone in most cases. Continue?
Implements the proposal in #6, plus the rest of the overheid baseline I run on. Branch:
bram.buijs:feat/overheid-baseline(9 commits). Evaluates green across the hosts.Hardening (opt-in), see #6: capabilities under
modules/<category>/, nothing auto-enabled inprofiles-dawo-generic; the org/host imports what it wants. Norm and origin per item indocs/standards.md(BIO/NCSC, cross-referenced to CIS-DIL / ANSSI / DISA STIG).services-usbguardis default-off and needs an allowlist, otherwise it blocks newly plugged USB.Declarative users:
users-hardened(opt-in,mutableUsers=false) plus agenix passwords (hashedPasswordFile), workflow indocs/users.md. Opt-in because it is lockout-risk.T495s reference client and in-place upgrade:
hardware/lenovo-t495s, a disko variantnvme-luks-ext4that matches an existing install (in-place migration without a wipe, reusing the lanzaboote keys), anddocs/deploy.md(nixos-anywhere + deploy-rs).Pin nixpkgs to 26.05: was
nixos-unstablewith a 25.11 fallback. This is a policy call, so if unstable is deliberate I'm happy to drop this commit.Happy to split into per-topic PRs if that is easier to review. (Small note: there's a
.forgejo/CI workflow in here that's mirror-specific; I'll drop it on request.)Modular hardening following the existing category layout: - boot/hardening: memory kernelParams - nixos/hardening: sysctl, sudo wheel-only, tmp mount options, login banner - services/{usbguard,openssh,journald,chrony}: base security + log/time sources - networking/client: log refused connections Optional opt-in modules (off by default): nixos/apparmor, nixos/pam-u2f, services/pcscd (smartcard), services/auditd (stubbed for the auditctl bug). Wired the base set into profiles-dawo-generic; docs/modules.md documents the enable/disable workflow. No SIEM shipper here by design.feat: overheid-baseline — hardening (opt-in), users, T495s-host, 26.05-pinto feat: overheid baseline — hardening (opt-in), users, T495s host, 26.05 pinfeat: overheid baseline — hardening (opt-in), users, T495s host, 26.05 pinto feat: overheid baseline & hardening (opt-in), users, T495s host, 26.05 pinfeat: overheid baseline & hardening (opt-in), users, T495s host, 26.05 pinto feat: overheid baseline (hardening opt-in, users, T495s host, 26.05 pin)@bram.buijs In general, please split up you large (and highly appreciated! 😄) PR into smaller chunks. Each with their own issue, describing what you're solving. This will lead to less discussion and faster merges of smaller (and less risky) code changes.
Secondly, please add proof of a working deploy/build by adding the output of your deploy command and/or a screenshot of a system as a comment.
Splitting this up per the review feedback, one topic per PR/issue:
Superseded by the above. Closing this one.
Pull request closed